KARL POPPER’S CRITIQUE OF HISTORICISM: AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL LIMIT OR A NORMATIVE POLITICAL STANCE?

Abstract

Karl Popper is one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century, particularly through his critical contributions to the philosophy of science and political philosophy. By introducing concepts such as the principle of falsifiability, the critique of historical prediction, and piecemeal social engineering, Popper addresses the shared problems of these two fields and directs a sustained critique against what he describes as historicism. According to Popper, the assumption that social and historical processes are governed by necessary and predictable laws cannot be scientifically justified, given the singular and unpredictable character of such processes. The acceptance of this assumption legitimizes claims of historical prediction and thereby provides a basis for closed and totalitarian tendencies in the political sphere. In this context, Popper’s critique of historicism reveals the connection between the epistemological implications of critical rationalism and the political ideals of the open society. The article discusses the scientific status of claims to historical prediction through Popper’s principle of falsifiability and his critique of induction, while also examining his criticisms of Plato, Hegel, and Marx in relation to the philosophical and political consequences of historicism. The study highlights the significance of Popper’s critique of historicism for liberal democratic thought and brings into focus debates concerning the generalizing aspects of this critique.